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It was past her bedtime. My husband and I heard the fridge slam shut and our three-year-
old daughter scuffle upstairs, down the hall to her bedroom. “Charlotte?” my husband called. She 
opened our door a crack. “What were you doing downstairs?” 
“Nothing,” she said, beaming like the morning sun. “I don’t have pie in my bed.”  
Discipline requires a somber disposition, which can be difficult for a parent who finds an 
entire pie hidden under a pillow. My response to Jon Klassen’s I Want My Hat Back, where an 
adorable bear gobbles up an adorable rabbit out of revenge and then gets away with it, included 
shock, maniacal laughter, and the urgent need to share the book with someone as cynical as 
myself. This was an anti-fable—it mocked the idea of a moral. In it, Klassen’s bear circumvents 
the conventional justice owed to fallen heroes and plot criminals alike; moreover, through the 
employment of an anti-moral, craftily cloaked in repetition, anthropomorphism, and irony, he 
emancipates the ethical from the moral, in fact clarifying for his readers the choice between right 
and wrong. 
I Want My Hat Back begins with a bear who wants his hat back. Because of his 
impeccable manners, and because he helps a turtle onto a rock, we identify the bear as “the good 
guy.” The plot thickens when the bear meets a rabbit wearing a bright red conical hat. In line 
with his minimalist style, Klassen color-codes the text. The rabbit’s font is red, like the hat, 
whereas every other animal’s font matches their physical appearance: green for the frog, rust for 
the fox, etc. It’s as if, upon telling a lie about the red hat, the rabbit has become the lie.  




“Have you seen my hat?” the bear asks. “No,” says the rabbit. “I would not steal a hat” 
(Klassen 8). The rabbit lies. Later, the bear confronts the hat-wearing rabbit. The following page 
features the bear wearing the hat, with no rabbit in sight. The bear is delightfully simplistic here: 
“I love my hat” (Klassen 28).  
Did the bear really eat the rabbit? I interviewed my children for some rhetorical response. 
Gabriel, age 7, said, “he sat on the rabbit. Maybe he scared him away.” Atticus, age 10, found 
the inference easy: “he ate the rabbit.” Charlotte, age 12, responded cautiously, “the rabbit was 
there, and now he’s not.” 
Does the bear feel no remorse? Through statements of denial, we confirm our suspicions 
when a squirrel comes by looking for the rabbit. “Excuse me,” he says, “have you seen a rabbit 
wearing a hat?” The bear lies: “No... I would not eat a rabbit” (Klassen 30). We infer through the 
repetition that the bear has devoured the rabbit. He has gone from victim to culprit, but no 
consequence falls from heaven.  
The protagonists in most picture books, especially Aesopic fables with proverbial morals, 
follow more predictable character arcs. For example, we may see the “bad guy does the wrong 
thing and is punished” storyline, as in Aesop’s “The Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing,” or the “good 
guy does the wrong thing and is punished” storyline, as in Beatrix Potter’s Peter Rabbit or in 
Mary Howitt’s The Spider and the Fly. We may find the softer “good guy does the wrong thing 
and is punished but then forgiven” plot, like in David Shannon’s No, David!, or, the “bad guy 
does the right thing and is rewarded” one, like in Oscar Wilde’s The Selfish Giant. Finally, the 
token favorite for superheroes, epic champions, pure maidens, and satisfying resolutions, is the 
“good guy does the right thing and is rewarded” plot, like in Dr. Seuss’s Horton Hatches the 
Egg. All these storylines have something in common; namely, good deeds are rewarded and bad 




ones punished. What we don’t often find is “good guy does the wrong thing, but is not 
punished”—the category to which Klassen’s book belongs. There, the moral of the story is 
conspicuously absent—the bear is contentedly loving his hat, and we wonder, “so, is dishonesty 
okay?”  
But we like our new hat. In her essay, “Innocence lost: picturebook narratives of 
depravity,” Katarzyyna Smyczynska warns us about the ending: 
“[I Want My Hat Back] uncritically sanctions violence inflicted on others 
in revenge. Klassen may have been inspired by the convention of animal fables or 
cautionary tales, but his work does not resemble either of these in one important 
aspect: the presence of the moral behind the story. In this book, there is no hope 
or way out of the moral swamp, where amorality is contagious” (66). 
Is Klassen tricking us into trying the amoral hat on, and letting the depraved state of modern 
culture do the rest?  Smyczynska also purports that the book “creates an overwhelming vision of 
the triumph and impunity of the powerful” (61).  
But animals eat one another all the time, don’t they? According to Gabriel, “the bear ate 
the rabbit because that’s what they do.” Charlotte points out that the law of food chains might 
make this right: “if a hamburger stole my hat,” she explains, “I would eat the hamburger.” So 
perhaps Klassen draws an imaginary line between nature and civilization? But if things are up 
for grabs in the wild, then why does the bear own a hat?  
That would be a convenient argument out of Smyczynska’s alleged moral swamp, but 
Klassen’s use of anthropomorphism implies human rules; for example, he employs details such 
as talking beasts, ownership of clothing, public spaces, revenge, polite social expressions, and 
the conspicuous fact there is only one word, namely “rabbit,” that identifies any of the characters 
as animals in the first place. Klassen isn’t hiding his message; this is no hat trick.  
Have we arrived at a barren wasteland devoid of all that is good? I agree with 
Smyczynska that the moral is not present, and yet I disagree that the result is amorality. Using an 




antimoral, Klassen is helping us see ethical choices more clearly without morality there to 
complicate things. This new view reflects the individualism of the world, just as the bear makes 
the choice to eat the rabbit. Why bother with portraying justice when that is no longer the way 
we see the world operate? Even 10-year-old Atticus has noticed that “sometimes you see 
someone lie and it works out well for them.”  
So--we may be in the moral swamp, but Klassen doesn’t abandon us there; he uses dead-
pan humor to point the way to Kantian ethics. He uses dramatic irony when the bear fails to 
grasp that the rabbit has seen the hat, verbal irony within the lies, and situational irony when the 
reader mistakenly expects the outcome of justice at the end. We laugh, and then know we do not 
want to be the fool in the fable. The illustrations reflect this intentionality by depicting the hat as 
a conical one. It is a dunce cap. Thus, in a reductio ad absurdum, we are moved to the ethical to 
avoid the ridiculous.  
Klassen emancipates the ethical from the moral by dispensing with punishment. In life, if 
not literature, the penal system is messy. My children tried hard to defend the bear in their post-
storytime interview: 
Charlotte: “The rabbit should be punished.”  
Gabriel: “I would steal that hat back. The bear is a good guy because he ate a bad 
rabbit.”  
Anita: “What if he had eaten a good rabbit?” 
Atticus: “See, as long as your crime is equivalent to their crime, it’s okay.” 
Anita: “So it’s okay to murder someone if they murder you?”  
 
Luckily, it is not the rabbit’s corrupting lesson we take with us, but our own surprise. 
Within the unexpectedness of the ending, Klassen invokes Immanuel Kant’s categorical 
imperative, which is, in brief: “act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law” (30). Klassen shows us the disintegration of 




society should we choose to lie, thereby providing external, amoral motivation to tell the truth. 
Klassen’s bear prepares us for a world in which ethics can exist without a moral to the story. 
Am I brave enough to dare imitate this? I’m still hiding pies in my bed, and I have too 
much to learn about the rules before I start breaking them and gobbling up rabbits; however, I 
deeply respect the courage of Klassen’s work, its elegant simplicity, and the way he surprises us, 
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